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Why We Must Take European Opinion Seriously

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"I think the bitter differences of the war are over."- George W. Bush[2]

Introduction

Much is accurate in the President's comment in late June, but it does not capture the full picture of trans-Atlantic relations. Differences run deeper than Iraq, including Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the overall American approach to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). European leadership questions the American commitment to NATO, its support for the European process, and the value of supporting American policy in the face of popular opposition. At the same time, the U.S. military is stretched by concurrent operations. Continuing on this path risks arriving at a place where the United States is unable to maintain ongoing commitments, meet new dangers, or muster international support for its diplomatic and military policies. It risks arriving at a place where NATO is no longer an effective alliance, the United States is a less capable country, and international security is lower.

This study, which is based heavily on discussions with diplomats and military representatives at NATO Headquarters, at the European Institutions, and in Washington, D.C.[3], is premised only on the national interest of the United States. It focuses on the benefits gained from its relationship with NATO allies and partners. NATO enhances American power[4], and NATO defense planning creates the ability for the United States to lead a coalition of willing and able states. Allies and partners develop their militaries to be interoperable in both equipment and operations.[5] Without peacetime planning and training, multilateral military operations would be inefficient or ineffective. A NATO operation also diffuses resistance toward the West as a whole, rather than leaving it targeted at the United States After the 1940s and the chronic warfare that plagued the European continent, it was NATO that helped create an environment of European pacification and unification. The European Union acknowledges this on the first page of its own European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 2003: "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO."[6] While the European peace is now self-sustaining, NATO also is the keystone to trans-Atlantic ties.

Without NATO, the relationship between the United States and the European Union and its Member States would be no different than the relationship between any other set of states. Most importantly, NATO diplomacy, in concert again with the European Union, reinforces common liberal values advocated by the United States. The consensus of twenty-six members of the North Atlantic Council confers legitimacy to NATO operations that can never be achieved by an American-led alternative coalition. An American created "coalition of the willing" is seen by some Europeans and others as merely the United States and its cronies (or poodles in the eyes of those who disagree). A NATO coalition indicates the mutual agreement of the leading free states of the world, and in emergencies such as Kosovo, can even offer an alternative mandate to that of the United Nations (U.N.). Proceeding after working to achieve a common position among competing views demonstrates liberal values in action; striking out based on raw

capabilities with the assistance of those who already agree demonstrates illiberal values and undermines what America tries to represent.

NATO has been a good partner for its members, especially for the United States, for many years. Now, however, another organization attracts the loyalty of many NATO members: the European Union, which includes nineteen NATO allies as members. The Union is also a global actor, and aspires to be more of one in the future.[7] Current issues in the U.S.-NATO relationship have a different context than those of the past because Europeans-and only the Europeans-have another partner that can fulfill their national aspirations. The question of the moment is how NATO and the European Union can maintain a relationship with each other and with the United States. As the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS02) says, "There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe."[8]

Four Apparent Problems and Trends

Four interrelated problems affect American relations with Europe.

First, American policy—on Iraq and many other issues—is highly unpopular in Europe. European opposition to the war in Iraq and to President Bush in particular is well known.[9] The standard opinion of Bush, at least among politically interested elites, is consistent with the liberal views of American filmmaker and political activist, Michael Moore. This problem will not completely vanish if there is a President Kerry. European leaders (if not their publics) recognize that foreign policy differences with America began before the incumbent took office, and are likely to remain regardless of who wins the 2004 election. In fact, the hopes that Kerry would not be Bush may yield a backlash if his policies retain continuity with the present. Europeans perceive the United States as a country that acts unilaterally, meaning acting "without sanction by an international organization." Furthermore, Europeans do not believe a link between Iraq and terrorism exists, and they question the American military emphasis on the terrorism problem; the entire European perspective on the threat posed by terrorism and how to meet such a threat differs from American perspective.[10] Most Europeans regard terrorism as a long-standing problem, not a new one, and place greater emphasis on judicial response rather than military action.[11]

Only the United Kingdom fully supported Bush's interpretation of the danger posed by Iraq. Other states joined out of a sense of duty and respect for the United States, displaying a need to stand with the United States as the leader of the free world.[12] They also joined out of a belief that standing with the United States would be good for their national interest, or even the interests and stature of their national leadership. Neither of these latter reasons is sustainable over time. The war has not been worth it for any partner or ally, since their electorates oppose the war and few, if any, tangible benefits have flowed to allies. Even the European sense of duty for the United States is fleeting. Unlike the European-American alliance following World War II, created and sustained by the Marshall Plan, contemporary European economic development is credited to the Union, not the United States. As the newest Member States to the European Union learn how to operate in the Union, they will find that their allegiance is not to each other, but to states similar in size and economic structure. They will become "old Europe" much more quickly than Americans appreciate.

Second, our unpopularity comes at a time when we are asking for increased European help with military operations. American forces are stretched by the open-ended occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the need to maintain military commitments to Japan, South Korea, and NATO. In total, around 333,000 American troops are deployed worldwide.[13] Under the standard guidelines for deployment, reconstitution, and training—or simply a cycle limiting deployments to one year out of three—this means one million American soldiers are committed in total, out of a congressionally-mandated end strength of just over 500,000. Even if 100,000 reservists were summoned for duty, a limit would seem to be in sight: America needs to either rotate troops more quickly, significantly increase the army's strength, or cut back on commitments.[14] Compounding the problem is the question of retention and recruiting, only partly and temporarily offset by stop-loss, bonuses, and the poor economy.

Some missions may be able to be taken on by others, but there remains a finite amount of troops worldwide that can be called upon for any mission, anywhere. We can have the circle of stars replace the stars and stripes in Bosnia, but that in turn reduces the NATO and partner forces available for other missions. Europeans contribute more readily to the missions in Afghanistan than to those in Iraq. States have even suggested contributing to the war in Iraq by sending forces to Afghanistan to allow American forces to go to Iraq.[15] Yet material commitments have been limited. One American officer refers to this as a sort of "donor fatigue." The support is real—the war in Afghanistan was justified, reconstruction is vital, and the pursuit of al-Qaeda diehards must continue. But the resources are not there. If the United States turns to new coalition partners, these partners, as a group, may be less capable than the Europeans would have been. New coalition partners would not have interoperable troops, and the use of such a coalition would heighten the Europeans' sense of American neglect and disdain, which is high enough already.

Third, our methods of addressing security concerns have led to fears that the United States does not care about NATO anymore. Increased European interest in security led to the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) formulated in the wake of Bosnia to help Europe overcome the "weakness and confusion" of its military policy.[16] It may seem odd to question the American commitment to NATO, but the facts support the allegation. The United States has not used NATO for its major operations since Kosovo, preferring to set up ad hoc coalitions. On 12 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council voted to invoke Article V against the previous day's attackers. Symbolically, the American response came in Secretary Rumsfeld's well-known comment that "the mission determines the coalition; the coalition doesn't determine the mission."[17] Thus Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) was conducted outside NATO auspices, with the alliance only coming in for the reconstruction under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While allies have not been very forthcoming with forces for ISAF, the same is true of the United States. There seem to be two parallel missions in Afghanistan, with complementary tasks. The United States conducts one, without NATO; NATO runs the other, without many Americans. This allows other states to believe that the United States sees NATO as an adjunct to its security policy, suitable for peripheral missions but otherwise an irritant. If Europeans perceive that NATO is not important for the United States, then it is easier for them to reduce NATO's priority as well.

Instead, they may believe that they must place a higher priority on their own capabilities in the Union. In addition, the United States seems to be changing NATO's mission away from collective defense, which remains the highest priority among many new members. These states share a different geopolitical reality than the United States. Their fear of terrorism is highly speculative. More than one indicated that they support the American policies primarily because they are resigned to that as a price one must pay for American protection. Afghanistan set a precedent that NATO will conduct missions far removed from the territory of its members. It appears that in U.S. military strategy, NATO stands for Nearly Anywhere Terrorists Operate. For Europeans, the desire to have NATO survive as an effective institution drives support for mission expansion more than the enthusiasm for the missions.

Fourth, American negative reaction to the ESDP has raised European distrust of American policy and increased the unpopularity of the American public. The United States seems to simultaneously hold three incompatible views toward the ESDP. One is supportive, arguing that enhancements under EU auspices will help NATO burden sharing by making it easier for Europeans to develop capabilities that augment American national interests. Another view is apprehensive, arguing that the EU is going to develop a parallel structure that—intentionally or not—will weaken NATO and undermine American national interests. Yet another view is dismissive, arguing that the EU will never amount to anything and this is all a sideshow that takes our attention away from American national interests. These contradictions confuse Europeans, make it easy to caricature U.S. policy, and contribute to the unpopularity of American policy with which we began this discussion. Some argue that the United States has no policy all; others argue that the policy is schizophrenic: in either case, it is not effective.

Europeans argue that the ESDP supports NATO goals. ESDP encourages the Europeans to develop enhanced military capabilities, which has been a priority in NATO for years. ESDP may have more appeal to the citizens and parliamentarians of some states because it is being done for Europe rather than to for NATO or for the United States. Some Americans fear that the Europeans will be unwilling to fund both

NATO and ESDP assets. Since the forces are transparently available to both organizations, this fear distills to the overhead and to the planning and operational headquarters functions. It seems unlikely that the Union would abandon NATO interoperability without a lot of pressure being placed on the Member States. Union decisions in the area of foreign policy must be reached by consensus, just like NATO's. There are many states in the Union that do not want the EU to take on a collective defense role, including the United Kingdom and other U.S. allies. The allies believe NATO has proven itself and want to keep the United States involved. The non-allies want to remain neutral, and do not want the EU to force them into an alliance. Most states in the Union already plan their forces in compliance with NATO guidelines. They have little interest in converting to a different set of rules.

Any of these problems, in isolation, would be difficult to manage. Taken as a reinforcing group, and in light of likely trends, they cannot be managed. Attainment of the goals of American National Security Strategy may require some tactical adjustments to American policies, including taking tangible action to meet European preferences. Before considering such adjustments, one must first dispel some of the arguments offered by those who would prefer to disregard European opinion.

Counter-arguments

There are many objections that can be raised to this assessment, most of them accurate but not relevant. Let us consider some of these before discussing the policy implications:

The war in Iraq was a multilateral operation.

True, in terms of the number of countries involved, and eighteen NATO members and aspirants publicly declared their support for the United States in January and February 2003.[18] The overwhelming majority of forces involved were American, however, to an even greater degree than the operations in the Balkans. More importantly, this is not what Europeans mean by "multilateral." In the liberal view of international politics proclaimed by most European countries, multilateralism implies a decision reached through an established due process, legitimate through its adherence to procedures. In March 2004, 80 percent of Germans and 64 percent of British (against 41 percent of Americans) believed that a country should get U.N. approval before using force.[19] To carry through Robert Kagan's analogy, if the sheriff and his posse of townspeople catch the bad guys, bring them before Judge Roy Bean and then hang them from a tree, we have a fine multilateral operation led by a peace officer. If the sheriff and posse catch them and string them up directly, we have an illegitimate unilateral action by a dangerous gunslinger. The result is the same—even the participants may be the same—but the process confers acceptance and assurance that the sheriff is under control.

Kosovo wasn't approved by the United Nations either, and the Europeans were on board with that.

True, a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution would have been vetoed by China or Russia, so NATO acted on its own, arguing that the UNSC had already determined that Serbian actions were a threat to peace (much as the Iraqi war was tied to many prior UNSC resolutions). There are several differences between the operations, however. First, despite a lack of U.N. authorization, NATO acted as an institution of nineteen democracies. Not only did NATO approve it, but also the conduct of the war followed NATO procedures, a tortuous but successful process as detailed by then Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark.[20] That alone transformed it from a U.S. mission into a multilateral one. Second, the Europeans tend to be nervous about using Kosovo as a precedent. This is not mere posturing on their part—they believe a wider legitimacy is required, especially for operations outside Europe. Otherwise, it is too easy to portray the action as nothing but "the West against the Rest," a Christian crusade against Islam. Third, the Europeans regarded Kosovo as an emergency situation that required immediate action. Milosevic's forces were in the process of killing Kosovars, and even though the immediate consequence of hostile action was an increase in the humanitarian nightmare, one could perceive the need to act—returning to our posse, this is deadly force against the criminal caught in the act. The European states that opposed action in Iraq—and even many of those who agreed to support

the action—did not see the same sort of urgency in eliminating Saddam Hussein. Finally, the scope of the Kosovo operation was much different. Iraq, from its start, was an invasion aiming at occupying Iraq and removing its recognized leader from power. Kosovo was a graduated effort to get Milosevic to change Serbian behavior. He remained in power for a while, ultimately turned over to an international tribunal that had indicted him according to a process set up by international agreement.

Saddam was a really bad guy and the world is better off without him.

True. Unquestionably true. This has absolutely no bearing on whether or not U.S. troops are stressed, whether or not the European public supports American policy, whether or not the United States is committed to NATO, or whether or not the United States has a clear policy towards Europe. The question of Saddam points out a fundamental difference between American and European Union thinking. The United States is project driven, the European Union is process driven. The United States cares about getting the job done, the European Union cares about how it is done. This difference may in fact be a very deep cultural divide, illustrated by other habits. American tourists tend to emphasize how many places they visit and how many pictures they take. European tourists tend to emphasize experiencing a place and a culture. Americans tend to want the food to be good (and often fast), no matter the surroundings; Europeans tend to want a prolonged culinary experience.

The French, Clinton, and everyone else thought that Iraq had a prohibited weapons program.

True, and it may yet turn out that some program may become known. The problem is, no one cares about that anymore. In large part, public suspicion is that the United States misled everyone, so his or her own leaders can be forgiven for being wrong. More to the point, the French view that inspections should have been maintained seems to have been vindicated. The public does not believe there was any urgent need to launch the war: no weapons, no ongoing upsurge in human rights violations, no recent invasions of other countries, and no increase in the disregard for United Nations resolutions. What, they asked at the time, was the problem with waiting a few more months for diplomacy—and they were not mollified by the American argument that our troops were getting very hot and tired sitting in the desert since they regarded the initial deployment as a bit presumptuous.

Many European countries, and others, supported us.

True, but the relevant question is whether or not they would do so again. They supported us because they wanted to stand with their prime ally and trusted the United States not to conduct an operation that was not fully justifiable to their people. The aftermath in Iraq and the lack of hard evidence supporting many of the arguments for war in Iraq have undermined that trust; the pain that the leadership of the supporting countries has gone through has reduced their incentive to stand with the United States.

The French are up to no good.

True, if by that we mean that they do not concur with the NSS goal that the United States should remain the single dominant force in international politics. They have clearly stated a preference for a multipolar world, and for the development of the European Union as an international actor. Chirac has called "for the Union gradually to assert itself as an active and powerful pole, on an equal footing with the United States."[21] Most famously, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine said on November 7, 1999, "We cannot accept a world that is politically unipolar or culturally uniform. Nor can we accept the unilateralism of the single hyper power. This is why we are fighting for a multipolar, diversified and multilateral world."[22] It is not at all clear, however, that the French want to destroy NATO. It is very clear that the rest of the European Union would need to approve of such a project, which the other Member States will not do, unless driven to that point by American policy. As Gerhard Schröder said on December 28, 1999, the United States "lacked consideration for its allies… Whining about U.S. dominance doesn't help; we have to act."[23]

The Europeans have no one else to turn to for security.

True, unless they turn to themselves. We can, if we wish, mock the Europeans for believing that they live in a militarily safe world. However, they in fact do live in a militarily safe world. Russia is many years away from being a realistic threat to the Union, and there are no other countries that have a capability of attacking them with anything other than ballistic missiles. Europeans are threatened by terrorism, but they do not regard terrorism as primarily a military problem. They can cooperate among themselves without NATO, and even without NATO the Union and United States would retain an interest in cooperation. They are more than capable of building forces for any other contingencies. They lack the will because they lack the need. American policies should not be aimed at helping the European Union believe that it needs to become militarily self-sufficient.

Relations with Europe are getting better anyway.

True, on the surface at least, but it is a bit early to say this can be sustained.[24] There was little room for relations to deteriorate further. The United States has adopted some of the concepts discussed in this paper already, and none of the European states want a prolonged fight with the United States. They know they must work with the United States, and possibly President Bush, for many years. Relations look better because we have not asked the Europeans to do anything for us—other than expand ISAF, which isn't going well—and because we have started doing things they want, like getting a U.N. mandate for Iraq.

We don't need NATO and Europe—we have the U.K. if we need anyone.

True, but only in the most narrowly military and shortsighted sense. The British have been with the United States consistently, and other European contributions to Afghanistan or Iraq could possibly be matched by increased American forces (from an increased American military). It is difficult to see how that is a policy outcome we want, unless we actually prefer to fight wars alone or with increasingly less capable allies with non-interoperable militaries. This argument also assumes that the international diplomatic situation is static, as opposed to worsening despite the short-term improvements.

Policy Comments

If we are going to maintain a strong link with our European allies, the United States needs to recognize the impact of European positions on our security, and act to improve European opinion of American policy.

As a first step, we need to stop betting against the trend. Much of American policy appears to be rooted in an optimistic present, assuming that things will get better before they get worse in the GWOT, in retention, and in Europe. This is not the trend. American forces are under stress, and that stress is likely to increase before it decreases. The mission will continue, the fighting will continue, and retention and recruiting and readiness will all suffer. The United States is unpopular, and it is not getting more popular. Perceptions of American lack of commitment to NATO grow as American operations exist in parallel to NATO or entirely separate from it.

The most important trend of all is the growth—enlargement and deepening—of the European Union. The Union is real. Some people like to assert that the most important international relationship for every other country is its relationship with the United States. To the extent that is true, it—in fact—is a bit of a problem because the United States then is forced to seem to ignore some of those countries. More to the point, the most significant international relationship for every Member State is with the European Union. Europe provides its Members markets, jobs, money, rules, and laws. There is an indisputable element of Europeanization on the domestic politics of Member States. The impact of the Union on foreign policy is newer, but also can be detected.[25] The European Union is becoming an actor that the United States must learn to accept, respect, and treat as a diplomatic partner.

As a second step, we need to make it clear that we support both the European Union and NATO. The State and Defense Departments need to adopt more of a focus on the Union as an actor rather than as an International Organization. It is not a state, but it is more like a state than it is like the U.N. This focus

should be reflected in the internal organization of those departments and in the training and orientation provided. The Union is not simply a combination of its members. There is a Union sensitivity to process and procedures that is different from Member State political culture. Just as we would not send a representative to Japan without a thorough grounding in its culture, we need to train those who work with the European Union in its theory and culture. For all our differences, only Canada, Australia, and New Zealand rival the Union in terms of its affinity to Western liberalism and culture. The European Union is not going to become what NSS02 seeks to avoid: an adversary of the United States. It will be a partner, a colleague, and an experienced advisor. At the same time, it is important that the United States demonstrate its commitment to NATO. The complications of coalition warfare are balanced by the gains in international goodwill and perceived legitimacy. An alliance is built on trust and commitment. If our allies do not see us using NATO, they may come to believe that they must learn to live without American security guarantees. They may come to question why they are supporting NATO, if NATO is simply a toolbox for American security priorities. Ultimately, we must persuade them that we see ourselves as part of a "team" of Western democracies, not as a prima donna who stands apart from and above the rest.
As a third step, we should de-emphasize the unilateral option and conduct elective wars only with an institutional mandate. Everyone knows the option exists, and everyone reserves the right to act in national interest. This is like a husband telling his wife that he reserves the right to get a divorce if he doesn't like how the relationship is going. Technically this is true, but it isn't something you put in the wedding vows or anniversary card. The United States is doing the same thing when it proclaims that it will do what it wants with whatever countries it wants. If it becomes necessary to take unilateral action, do so. Just don't talk about it ahead of time—it is counterproductive.

As a fourth step, we need to take a significant step to disprove European public beliefs. The American image among many Europeans is that of a country that believes it is above the law, the living incarnation of "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."[26] After Iraq and Abu Ghraib, it is too late for rhetoric to make a difference. Getting a U.N. mandate for the force in Iraq and withdrawing the 2004 UNSC Resolution seeking ICC exemptions are seen as things the United States was forced to do, thus without moral value. Only a significant concrete step will now convince the Europeans to revise their image of American policy.

Only three possibilities may be enough: resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, or joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Of these, the Kyoto Protocol has significant flaws in terms of verifiability, equity, and effectiveness—and substantial and well-funded domestic opposition. It also is not very relevant to the specific problem. Resolution of the Middle East conflict is much more relevant to Europeans and to the problem, but resolution of this problem may well be beyond American control right now, and it is difficult to envisage a peace plan that would satisfy everyone. The ICC, on the other hand, presents much less danger than what is portrayed, and speaks directly to the questions now being raised: respect for international law and human rights. The principles of complementarity built into the Rome Statute protect those subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The only possibly vulnerable Americans are elected officials. This is more theory than reality, however. The ICC is dominated by states that share the values America professes. It does not want to persecute Americans. In any case, the ICC, like every organization, has its own interests to worry about. Prosecution of American officials would destroy the court, because its other members would not tolerate it. They all believe their leaders are safe from the ICC—if they are wrong, they will leave, just as we would leave if our leaders faced prosecution.

References

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2. George W. Bush, Remarks in Press Availability during United States, European Union Summit, Shannon Ireland, June 26, 2004.

3. In order to maintain the integrity of those interviews, this study will neither identify those sources nor provide a list of persons interviewed. They include persons working for the United States government, in Washington, Brussels, and at SHAPE in Mons; persons on the institutional staff of NATO and the European Union; and national representatives of Italy, Spain, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, Latvia, Germany, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. All these persons are identified here as "he" to further mask their identity.

4. See, for example, "Defending Freedom, Fostering Cooperation, and Promoting Stability," Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., Commander, United States European Command, to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, April 10, 2003.

5. Australia, the most prominent other state to join such coalitions, uses these standards as well.

6. "A Secure Europe in a Better World," *European Security Strategy*, December 2003, 1.

7. *European Security Strategy*, 4.

8. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 25.

9. "Transatlantic Trends 2003," July 2003, survey by German Marshall Fund of the United States.

10. See Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalition: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).

11. *European Security Strategy*, 12.

12. "'The Transatlantic Bond is our Guarantee of Freedom:' Declaration of Eight European Leaders in Support of United States on Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 30, 2003.

13. The United States Army, American Military Operations.

14. A full assessment of this situation would require a separate report, along the lines of Michael C. Ryan, "Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPSTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much?" CRS Report for Congress, January 14, 1998.

15. Suggested in Katrin Bennhold, "Spain May Add Peacekeepers to Afghanistan," *International Herald Tribune*, March 24, 2004; sent without explicit linkage in Renwick McLean, "Spain to Send More Troops for Afghans," *The New York Times*, July 3, 2004.

16. Tony Blair, comments at Pörtschach, Austria, quoted in Peter van Ham, *Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000): 5-6.

17. *Face the Nation*, September 23, 2001.

18. In a series of newspaper columns on January 29, 2003 and in a statement on February 5, 2003. A 19th country, the Netherlands, almost certainly would have joined this group except it was under a caretaker government.

19. "A Year After Iraq War, Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists," March 16, 2004, survey by the PEW Research Center for the People and the Press.

20. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

21. Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000) 130-3.

22. Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Into the Twenty-First," Speech at the Opening of the IFRI Conference, Paris, November 3, 1999.

23. Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?" in Carpenter, ed., *NATO Enters the 21st Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 21.

24. For additional discussion of this, see Elizabeth Pond, "Lurching Back Together," *International Politik (International Edition)* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2004) 11-15.

25. For general discussions of the influence membership may have on national policies, see Tanja Börzel, "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member States Responses to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 193-214; Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 1 (1994): 69-88; Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-Operation," *Journal of European Public Policy* 7, no. 4, 613-31; Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the 'Old' and the 'New' Europe?" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9, no. 1, 67-92; Sten Rynning, "The European Union: Toward a Strategic Culture," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 4, 479-94.

26. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, ed. by Robert B. Strassler (New York: Touchstone, 1996): 5.89. Only three years after providing that wisdom to the Melians before killing the men and selling the women and children into slavery, the Athenian army found itself on the receiving end of such treatment after the failure of the Syracuse expedition.

About the Author

Major Thomas S. Mowle is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, currently deployed with the Multinational Force—Iraq. His book on trans-Atlantic relations, *Allies at Odds?,* will be published in October. He also has published articles in *Disarmament* and *Political Psychology*.